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1. Introduction 
Most political goals are concerned with aggregate indicators of the economy. In order to achieve these 
political goals, economic policy instruments are used to change individual consumption. The 
effectiveness of these instruments depends on the aggregate response of all consumers. We know from 
the aggregation literature that unless consumers are homogeneous in their demand responses, we may 
experience aggregation problems. The main concerns in the existing aggregation literature have been: 
what restrictions on the micro functions are necessary for aggregate demand to exist as a function of 
aggregate income; when can aggregate demand be given a behavioural interpretation; and when does 
aggregate demand have welfare implications?1 The early work on aggregation is dominated by 
Gorman’s and Muellbauer’s theories of the representative agent (Gorman 1953, Blackorby and 
Shorrocks 1995, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a, 1980b). Later, Lau developed the concept of exact 
aggregation (Lau 1981, Lau and Wu 1987, 1996). The main finding in this literature is that if 
consumers are heterogeneous in their responses to income change, we can give the macro function 
neither a behavioural nor a welfare interpretation, and it may not even be meaningful to assume the 
existence of aggregate demand as a function of aggregate income. If it is inappropriate to assume the 
existence of an aggregate demand function, the interpretation of price and income derivatives from an 
aggregate demand function estimated using macro data is problematic. 
 
Alternatively, we may estimate individual demand by using micro data, and then use estimated micro 
properties to predict aggregate demand responses. Analyses based on micro data can always be given a 
behavioural interpretation. However, it is not obvious that the properties of the micro functions 
transfer to aggregate demand (see, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995 for a 
discussion). This creates differences between micro and macro elasticities.2 If consumers are 
heterogeneous, we may experience disaggregation bias when using estimated micro properties to 
predict aggregate demand responses (hereafter referred to as the reverse aggregation problem). The 
criteria for the existence of an aggregate demand function may differ from the criteria for reverse 
aggregation. This is because the existence of an aggregate demand function only requires homogeneity 
across consumers with respect to income changes, whereas reverse aggregation also requires 
homogeneity with respect to price changes (see the discussion in Section 2). 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), and Forni and Brighi (1991) 
for discussion. 
2 See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Stoker (1986), Buse (1992) and Denton and Mountain (2001, 2004) for 
discussion of the differences between micro and macro elasticities. 
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Potential disaggregation bias from using estimated micro properties to predict aggregate demand 
responses, i.e., the reverse aggregation problem, is not often discussed in the literature. Blundell, 
Pashardes and Weber (1993) compare estimation results based on micro data with estimation results 
based on aggregated micro data (15 years of the British Family Expenditure Survey), for which they 
allow for heterogeneity in income derivatives. They find significant differences in the estimation 
results,3 and conclude in the abstract that “aggregate data alone are unlikely to produce reliable 
estimates of structural price and income coefficients”. In another interesting paper, Blundell, Meghir 
and Weber (1993) present an empirical methodology for testing whether aggregate data can be used to 
estimate micro parameters. However, in neither of the papers do the authors discuss potential 
disaggregation bias from using micro estimates to predict aggregate demand. Denton and Mountain 
(2001, 2004) discuss differences between aggregated and disaggregated elasticities. They calculate 
aggregated elasticities based on estimates of micro elasticities by using the results in Blundell, 
Pashardes and Weber (1993). Their aim is to explore the degree of disaggregation bias. They find that 
the disaggregation bias is relatively small. However, they do not discuss the effect on the results of 
heterogeneity in price derivatives and price variation across consumers.4 The criteria under which it is 
appropriate to assume reverse aggregation have not, to this author’s knowledge, previously been 
discussed in the literature. 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the conditions under which estimated micro properties can be used 
to predict aggregate demand responses without generating disaggregation bias. That is, we aim to find 
the criteria for reverse aggregation. We also discuss how the criteria for reverse aggregation relate to 
the existing literature on aggregation problems, and in particular to Gorman’s and Muellbauer’s work 
on linear and non-linear aggregation. We expand the theory of linear and non-linear aggregation to 
study how price variation across consumers affects the transfer of micro properties to the macro 
function, and discuss how these changes affect the potential for aggregation bias. We also expand the 
existing empirical literature on differences between micro and macro elasticities by discussing the 
effect on aggregation of price variations across consumers. In the literature, most tests for the 
existence of a representative consumer are based on macro data (see, for example, Russell, Breunig 
and Chiu 1998 for a discussion). In this study, we test all hypotheses about aggregation by using micro 
data. The case of Norwegian household electricity demand is used as an example. 
 
                                                     
3 Similar results are found by Halvorsen, Larsen and Nesbakken (2001). 
4 In most of the aggregation literature, it is assumed that all consumers face equal prices. One exemption is Lau and Wu’s 
discussion of exact aggregation (Lau and Wu 1996). 
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The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief summary of the aggregation 
problem. The main criteria for linear and non-linear aggregation are stated and expanded to the case in 
which prices may vary across consumers. Then, the criteria for reverse aggregation are discussed and 
compared to criteria for linear and non-linear aggregation. In Section 3, we analyse Norwegian 
residential electricity consumption. We describe our data and estimation results, and formulate and test 
hypotheses of linear and reverse aggregation. In Section 4, concluding remarks are made. A detailed 
discussion of the aggregation properties of the generalized linear functional form (non-linear 
aggregation) is given in the appendix. 
2. The aggregation problem 
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) distinguish between three types of questions concerning 
aggregate demand. The first is whether aggregated demand exists as a function of prices and 
aggregated wealth or income. If consumers respond differently to income, a redistribution of wealth 
between consumers changes aggregate demand even though aggregate income is constant. The second 
question is whether aggregate demand can be given a behavioural interpretation (as a demand 
response). For some behavioural properties, aggregation is automatic; examples include continuity, 
homogeneity and Walras’ law. By contrast, the weak axiom (WA) of revealed preference does not 
transfer automatically to aggregate demand. The idea behind the WA is that if x is revealed to be at 
least as good as y, then y cannot be revealed preferred to x. This is a basic assumption of consistency 
in choice behaviour. Finally, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) discuss the existence of a 
representative consumer. To assume a representative consumer, aggregate demand must be inferred 
from utility maximization by a representative consumer. This implies that aggregate demand must 
satisfy the strong axiom of revealed preference, which generates the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix 
(also referred to as integrability). If we can assume a representative consumer, aggregate demand has 
welfare implications. Another question (not discussed by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green) is whether 
the properties of the micro functions can help to determine aggregate demand responses to a policy 
instrument when there are aggregation problems. 
 
The main aim of this section is to describe the criteria that ensure reverse aggregation and to discuss 
how these criteria relate to the criteria for linear and non-linear aggregation. We start by describing the 
criteria for linear aggregation (Gorman’s representative consumer) and non-linear aggregation 
(Muellbauer’s representative consumer). Then, we discuss the criteria for reverse aggregation and 
explain how these are related to the criteria for linear and non-linear aggregation. All aggregation 
criteria are discussed under the assumption that prices are constant and under the assumption that 
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prices vary across consumers. That is, the theories of linear and non-linear aggregation are extended to 
apply when prices vary across consumers. As discussed by Forni and Brighi (1991), the behavioural 
interpretation of aggregate demand is lost in Lau’s concept of exact aggregation. Since our aim is to 
predict aggregate demand responses, we need a behavioural interpretation. Thus, we do not discuss 
Lau’s theory of exact aggregation further in this paper. 
2.1. Linear aggregation 
In this section, we discuss the criteria for the existence of an aggregate demand function and Gorman’s 
representative consumer. This is known as the case of linear aggregation. In addition to assuming that 
prices are equal across agents, as Gorman did, we also assume that prices are allowed to vary. 
2.1.1. Equal prices 
Assume that individual h’s consumption of good i ( hiq ) is a function of income (
hy ) and a vector of 
prices ( p ), which is assumed to be equal for all consumers. The demand function is given by 
( )hhihi ypfq ,= . Assume further that the income distribution is exogenous to the choice of whether to 
consume good i. Aggregate demand for good i ( iQ ) is defined as the sum of all individual 
consumption demands. Aggregate consumption is thus a function of the price vector and individual 
incomes: ( ) ( )HiH
h
hh
ii yypGypfQ .....,,,,
1
1
==∑
=
, where H denotes the number of individuals. 
 
To assume the existence of an aggregate demand function (Fi) as a function of prices (p) and aggregate 
income ( ∑
=
=
H
h
hyY
1
), the sum of all individual consumption demands must equal the aggregate 
demand function: 
 
(1) ( ) ( )YpFyypGQ iHii ,.....,,, 1 == . 
 
This is the case if individual income is a fixed proportion of aggregate income for all consumers (that 
is, if Yry hh = ), or if the micro functions are given by: 
 
(2) ( ) ( ) hhihi ypbpaq += . 
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Gorman proved that the micro functions in (2) imply the existence of the aggregate demand function in 
(1). That is, for the macro function to exist, all consumers must have the same demand response to 
income changes. If prices do not vary across consumers, heterogeneity is allowed in the constant term, 
h
ia . Furthermore, the income derivative cannot be a function of income because income must appear 
linearly in the demand function. This is the same as assuming linear and parallel Engel curves for all 
individuals. In this case, the aggregate demand function is given by: 
 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
+=+==
H
h
i
h
iii YpbpaYpbpaYpFQ
1
, . 
 
In order to assume a representative consumer, we also need to impose integrability on the aggregate 
demand function. To transfer the adding-up condition to the macro function and to ensure the non-
negativity of demand quantities for all goods, the income–expansion paths must pass through the 
origin for all consumers ( ( ) 0=pahi ) and utility-maximizing agents must have homothetic 
preferences.5 Thus, for Gorman’s representative agent to exist, the individual demand function must be 
given by ( ) hhi ypbq = . This function implies the following aggregate demand function for the 
representative consumer: ( )YpbQi = . That is, all consumers must have the same income response but 
not the same price response, because the price response is a function of income. See, for example, 
Forni and Brighi (1991) for more information. 
2.1.2. Varying prices 
The theory of the existence of an aggregate demand function and of Gorman’s representative 
consumer is discussed in the context in which all consumers face the same prices (p). However, actual 
prices often vary across consumers. This is particularly true of Norwegian household electricity 
consumption, which we use as an example to test for aggregation problems. Thus, we must find the 
criteria for the existence of an aggregate demand function and of Gorman’s representative consumer 
when prices vary across consumers. The problem involves finding the criteria for the existence of 
mean (aggregate) consumption as an integrable function of mean prices and mean income, when 
prices, as well as income, vary across consumers. 
 
                                                     
5 To allow for quasi-homothetic preferences, we must assume that the income–expansion paths are only defined above a 
given indifference surface, for example, above a minimum consumption level. 
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In order for the aggregate demand function to exist as a function of aggregate income and prices, we 
must assume either that: (i) prices and income are proportional to aggregate (mean) prices and income 
for all consumers, that is, Yry hh =  and i
h
i
h
i prp = ; or (ii) the micro functions are linear in prices and 
income. The only heterogeneity is in the constant term. In case (ii), the micro demand function must 
be given by (4) for the aggregate demand function to exist as a function of aggregate prices and 
income: 
 
(4) ∑ ++=
k
h
i
h
kk
h
i
h
i ycpbaq . 
 
In this case, the consumption of the aggregate consumer (expressed in mean terms) is given by: 
 
(5) ∑ ++=
k
ikkii ycpbaq . 
 
For this macro consumer to be representative, that is, to transfer the adding-up condition to the macro 
function and to impose the non-negativity of demand quantities for all goods, the income–expansion 
paths must pass through the origin for all consumers ( 0=hia ). That is, when prices are allowed to 
vary across consumers, the micro demand functions are given by ∑ +=
k
h
i
h
kk
h
i ycpbq , and the 
demand function of a representative mean consumer is given by ∑ +=
k
ikki ycpbq . 
2.2. Non-linear aggregation 
Linear aggregation is relatively restrictive on individual consumption. Instead of assuming that the 
consumer is representative in terms of consumption, we may assume that the consumer is 
representative in terms of expenditure shares. This is the case of non-linear aggregation. This type of 
aggregation is less restrictive than linear aggregation because it allows the derivatives of the demand 
function with respect to expenditures to differ across consumers (see, for example, Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1980 and Forni and Brighi 1991; see also the appendix for a discussion). We discuss the 
criteria for the existence of an aggregate expenditure share function and of Muellbauer’s representative 
consumer. This case is discussed when prices are equal, and when prices are allowed to vary across 
agents. We also discuss what happens when we relax the assumption that the distribution of income is 
exogenous in the consumption decision. 
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2.2.1. Exogenous income distribution and equal prices 
First, suppose that prices are equal across consumers and that the distribution of income is exogenous 
in the consumption decision. Under what conditions on the micro expenditure share functions ( hiw ) 
does an aggregate expenditure share function ( iW ) exist as a function of aggregate income (Y)? That 
is: 
 
(6) ( )( ) ∑===
h
h
i
h
H
ii
ii
i wY
yyypgpW
Y
pQW .....,,,, 1 , 
 
where ( )Hi yypg .....,,, 1  is a function that describes how the distribution of income affects aggregate 
consumption. Non-linear aggregation implies that the expenditure shares are linear functions of each 
other when aggregate wealth changes at given prices, even if the Engel curves are not linear. This 
property is known as generalized linearity (GL). Muellbauer has shown that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for non-linear aggregation are that the micro and macro demand relations are 
given by: 
 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pygpcypbypfq hhiihihihi ,, +==  
 
and 
 
(8) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]YyypgpcpbY
Y
ypg
pcpbYyygpXQ Hiiih
hh
i
ii
H
iii ...,,,
,
...,,, 11 +=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+==
∑
,  
 
where ( ) ( ) Yypgyypg
h
hh
i
H
i ∑= ,...,,, 1 . Heterogeneity in micro behaviour is incorporated in the 
form of different functions, hig . However, the coefficients ib  and ic  must be identical across agents. 
 
Muellbauer has shown that, given this structure on the micro functions, the properties of the micro 
function transfer to the macro relationship. Hence, equation (8) can be interpreted as the demand of a 
representative consumer. The income of the representative consumer ( oY ) is implicitly defined by the 
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equation ( ) ( )∑=
h
hh
i
o
i ypgYYpg ,, . The function ig , and thus also oY , depends on prices and the 
distribution of income across consumers; that is, ( )Hoo yypYY .....,,, 1= . 
 
The existence of Muellbauer’s representative agent allows the quantity demanded by the 
representative agent to differ from aggregate demand. This is because, when the problem is defined in 
terms of expenditure shares, the income of the representative agent may differ from aggregate income 
(see Appendix A1 for more information). This has important implications for our purposes. As noted 
by Forni and Brighi (1991), this implies that even if the micro properties aggregate to the macro level 
in this case, the properties do not necessarily relate to market demand. This is because it is the demand 
of the representative agent, not the actual macro demand relationship, that is integrable. 
2.2.2. Endogenous income distribution and varying prices 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) do not discuss the criteria for non-linear aggregation when consumers 
face different prices. They do, however, relax the assumption of the exogenous distribution of 
expenditures. They find that if all consumers receive equal prices for labour (for example, equal 
hourly wages), non-linear aggregation is possible. However, when consumers have different hourly 
wages, non-linear aggregation is no longer possible unless there is separability in the consumption of 
goods and leisure. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) note that this result implies that every good whose 
price varies between consumers must be separable from the consumption of other goods for non-linear 
aggregation to be allowed. 
 
In practice, prices on many goods vary across consumers. So, what are the criteria for non-linear 
aggregation when prices vary? Is Deaton and Muellbauer’s argument about separability in 
consumption sufficient to guarantee the existence of a representative consumer when prices vary 
across agents? To investigate this, we assume that the function hig  is independent of prices and only 
depends on income. In addition, we define the function hkm , which represents the heterogeneity in the 
price derivative with respect to the price of good k. In addition, we assume that all coefficients in the 
demand function are equal across consumers. This yields the following micro demand function: 
 
(9) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ +++==
k
h
k
h
ikik
hh
ii
h
i
k
h
kki
hh
i
h
i pmdygcybpayPfq , . 
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Equation (9) implies that price and income derivatives differ across consumers because the functions 
( )hhi yg  and ( )hkhik pm  vary across consumers.6 However, is the micro function in (9) consistent with the 
existence of an aggregate expenditure share function as a function of the mean prices and aggregate 
income when prices, as well as income, vary across consumers? That is, can one guarantee the 
following? 
 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ∑===
h
h
ih
i
i
h
H
i
H
K
H
i
ii
i wp
p
Y
yyygppppppW
Y
pQW KK ...,,,...,,...,,...,, 1111 11  
 
The micro expenditure share function associated with the demand function in (9) is given by: 
 
(11) ( )[ ] ( )h hihhiihii
k
h
k
h
ikik
h
kkih
h
ih
i y
pygcpbpmdpa
y
pw +++= ∑ . 
 
Inserting equation (11) into the criterion for the existence of an aggregate expenditure share function 
in equation (10) yields: 
 
(12) ( ) ( )HkkkI
k
ik
H
iiii
I
k
kiik
i ppmdyygcpbY
PpaW ...,,....,, 1
1
1
1
∑∑
==
+++= , 
 
where ( ) ( )
Y
ygp
yyg
H
h
hh
ii
H
i
∑
=
=
11 ....,, , ( ) ( )
Y
pmp
ppm
H
h
h
k
h
iki
H
kkik
∑
=
=
11 ...,,  and ∑
=
=
H
h
h
ii pP
1
. It can be 
shown that the expenditure share function in (11) is consistent with the existence of an aggregate 
expenditure share function (see Appendix A2). The aggregate expenditure share may either be written 
as a function of individual prices and income, or as a function of a representative price ( oip ) and a 
representative income ( oY ). The representative price and income is found implicitly by solving the 
functions ( )( ) ( )
Y
ygp
yyYg
H
h
hh
ii
Ho
i
∑
=
=
11 ....,,  and ( )( ) ( )
Y
pmp
pppm
H
h
h
k
h
iki
H
kk
o
kik
∑
=
=
11 ...,,  with respect 
to oip  and 
oY . 
                                                     
6 See Appendix A2 for more information. 
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2.3. Reverse aggregation 
The most commonly used method for predicting aggregate demand from micro estimates is to use the 
properties of the mean consumer (the consumer with mean properties).7 So, what are the main criteria 
for avoiding disaggregation bias when applying this method? To avoid disaggregation bias when using 
micro estimates to predict aggregate demand, the consumption of the mean consumer multiplied by 
the number of consumers must equal aggregate consumption. We may also want to use micro esti-
mates to predict the aggregate effect on consumption of price and income changes. That is, we want 
the predicted change in consumption for the mean consumer multiplied by the number of consumers to 
equal the aggregate demand response. For these criteria to be fulfilled, restrictions on the properties of 
the micro functions are required. These restrictions may depend on whether consumers pay equal or 
different prices for the same good. 
2.3.1. Equal prices 
Individual h’s consumption of good i ( hiq ) is assumed to be a function of his or her income ( hy ) and a 
vector of prices { }Ippp .....,,1=  that is assumed to be equal across consumers; that is, 
( )hhihi ypfq ,= . The consumption of the mean consumer is given by ( )ypfi , , where y  is mean 
income. In order to use the consumption of the mean consumer to predict aggregate demand, the 
consumption of the mean consumer multiplied by the number of consumers should equal aggregate 
consumption ( iQ ): 
 
(13) ( ) ( ) iH
h
hh
ii QypfHypf ==∑
=1
,, . 
 
That is, the consumption of the mean consumer must equal mean consumption. To use micro estimates 
to predict the aggregate demand response from price and income changes, the derivatives of the mean 
consumer’s consumption multiplied by the total number of consumers (H) must equal aggregate price 
and income responses: 
 
(14) ( ) ( )∑
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ H
h i
hh
i
i
i
p
ypfH
p
ypf
1
,,  , 
 
                                                     
7 This is the method applied by, for example, Denton and Mountain (2001, 2004) to test for disaggregation bias. 
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(15) ( ) ( )∑
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ H
h
h
hh
ii
y
ypfH
y
ypf
1
,,  . 
 
Equation (13) implies that the properties of the mean consumer can be used to predict the aggregate 
price response if the price response of the mean consumer is equal to the mean response of all 
consumers. Similarly, the properties of the mean consumer can be used to predict the aggregate 
income response if the mean consumer’s income response equals the mean response of all consumers. 
 
For equations (13) to (15) to be valid, micro demand functions must be linear in income and prices, as 
in equation (4). This is because heterogeneity in price and/or income derivatives may cause the 
derivative of the mean consumer to differ from the mean derivative of all consumers. 
2.3.2. Varying prices 
When prices vary across consumers, the mean consumer is characterized by both mean income and 
mean prices. In this case, the criteria for avoiding problems with reverse aggregation are given by: 
 
(16) ( ) ( ) iH
h
hhh
ii QypfHypf ==∑
=1
,, , 
 
(17) ( ) ( )∑
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ H
h
h
i
hhh
i
i
i
p
ypfH
p
ypf
1
,,  , 
 
(18) ( ) ( )∑
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ H
h
h
hhh
ii
y
ypfH
y
ypf
1
,,  , 
 
where hp  is a vector of prices specific to consumer h and p is a vector of all mean prices over all 
consumers. 
 
The essential criterion for avoiding problems with reverse aggregation is that all partial derivatives 
must be equal across consumers irrespective of consumers’ initial incomes and prices. If this is not the 
case, disaggregation bias might arise when using estimates for the mean consumer from micro data to 
predict aggregate demand responses. A sufficient condition for this criterion to be fulfilled is that the 
micro demand functions are linear in both income and prices, as in equation (4). 
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The criterion for the existence of reverse aggregation is thus irrespective of whether prices are equal or 
vary across consumers. The reason is that we want to avoid disaggregation bias not only when using 
micro estimates to predict the aggregate consumption level, but also when using micro estimates to 
predict aggregate changes in consumption following price and income changes. If we only wanted to 
predict aggregate consumption (not changes in consumption), the criterion for reverse aggregation 
could be relaxed when prices are equal because prices need not enter the micro functions in a linear 
form. In this case, reverse aggregation is equivalent to the existence of an aggregate demand function 
(discussed in section 2.1.1) that incorporates heterogeneity in price derivatives. 
2.4. Reverse versus linear and non-linear aggregation 
From the above discussion, linear aggregation only ensures reverse aggregation when prices are allowed 
to vary across consumers. In this case, the criteria for the existence of an aggregate demand function are 
the same as the criteria for reverse aggregation. However, this is not the case when prices are the same for 
all consumers. This is because linear aggregation requires income derivatives, but not price derivatives, to 
be equal across consumers. If Gorman’s representative consumer is valid, we may still experience pro-
blems with reverse aggregation when prices are equal, even if the homogeneity and adding-up conditions 
remove some of the heterogeneity in the price derivatives through the constant terms in the micro 
functions. This is because the price derivatives are functions of income, and thus vary across consumers. 
 
Non-linear aggregation cannot ensure reverse aggregation whether or not prices vary across consumers. 
This is because the criteria for non-linear aggregation allow heterogeneity in price and income 
derivatives through the functions hig  and 
h
ikm  (when prices vary across consumers). Furthermore, since 
the income of the representative agent may differ from aggregate income, the consumption of a 
representative agent may differ from aggregate demand. Thus, the existence of Muellbauer’s representa-
tive agent does not ensure reverse aggregation. This means that if we have estimated an AIDS by using 
micro data, it may not be appropriate to use these estimates to predict the effects on aggregate demand of 
policy instruments, even if the AIDS model is consistent with Muellbauer’s representative agent. 
 
Whether the criteria for reverse aggregation, the existence of an aggregate demand function or an 
aggregate expenditure share function, and the existence of Gorman’s or Muellbauer’s representative agent 
are met is an empirical question, which needs to be tested in each individual case. In the next section, we 
formulate and test hypotheses about linear and reverse aggregation by using estimation results based on 
micro data on Norwegian household electricity consumption. We do not test hypotheses about non-linear 
aggregation because non-linear aggregation is not sufficient to avoid disaggregation bias. 
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3. Norwegian residential electricity demand 
Norwegian household electricity consumption is a useful example of a good for which aggregation 
problems are relevant. Norwegian households are likely to be heterogeneous in their electricity 
demand. This, among other reasons, is because the substitution possibilities vary considerably across 
households, as the stock and capacity of heating equipment vary (see Table 1). In this section, we 
estimate Norwegian household demand for electricity by using micro data, taken primarily from the 
Norwegian Survey of Consumer Expenditures (SCE), to test the assumptions behind reverse 
aggregation and the existence of an aggregate demand function. 
3.1. The data 
The data used in the analysis come from different sources and contain information on 3,511 individual 
households in 1993, 1994 and 1995. The main data source is the annual Norwegian SCE (see Statistics 
Norway 1996).8 Our data include information on annual electricity expenditure, electricity suppliers, the 
ownership of durables, heating technology and other household and dwelling characteristics. Information 
on electricity prices was collected from households’ individual electricity suppliers and the Norwegian 
Water Resources and Energy Directorate. If price information for a household is missing, the mean price 
of all power suppliers distributing to the household’s area of residence (municipality) is allocated to the 
household.9 Individual prices on paraffin, fuel oil and firewood were obtained from the SCE, and 
calculated as expenditure divided by quantity. These prices are averaged by county and applied to 
households in that county for which neither a positive expenditure on, nor an amount of, firewood, 
paraffin and/or fuel oil is recorded. The Norwegian Institute of Meteorology provides annual information 
on regional variations in temperature for all municipalities included in the SCE. 
 
Table 1 reports the mean, minimum and maximum values of key variables in the data set. First, note 
that there are considerable variations in energy prices and income. This is particularly true for prices 
on firewood. In addition, households are relatively heterogeneous in terms of household and residence 
characteristics. For example, the number of household members ranges from one to 12, and 
households range from 12 m2 rented net floor spaces to owner-occupied 550 m2 houses. This implies 
large differences in the need for electricity for room and water heating and thus probably creates 
heterogeneity in price and income derivatives. In addition, substitution possibilities between electricity 
and other energy sources vary considerably. For example, 80 per cent of the households in the sample 
                                                     
8 The Norwegian SCE is supplemented by additional information on energy use and the stock of heating equipment in the 
years under study in this analysis. 
9 In this period, most households used their local power distributor. 
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can use firewood and electricity for heating. The number of electric heaters, stoves and rooms with 
floor heating also varies considerably. This variation is also likely to create heterogeneity in the 
household responses to price and income changes.  
 
Heterogeneity across households may affect the demand function in several ways. Consider two 
groups of households: one may only use electricity for heating, whereas the other may use both 
electricity and fuel oil in a central heating system. The former will, on average, consume more 
electricity and their electricity consumption will be less sensitive to price and income changes, ceteris 
paribus, because they cannot substitute other energy goods for electricity when electricity prices rise. 
Furthermore, the variation in observed electricity consumption will be higher for the other group 
because some households will use electricity only whereas others will use only fuel oil or a 
combination of electricity and fuel oil for heating. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of key variables in the data set based on the sample from the 
Norwegian Consumer Expenditure Survey 1993–1995 
 Mean Minimum Maximum
Electricity consumption (kWh)a) 22 860 0 89 149
Paraffin consumption (kWh)b) 821 0 109 150
Fuel-oil consumption (kWh)b) 690 0 122 277
Firewood consumption (kWh)b) 3 113 0 227 500
 
Electricity price (øre/kWh) 44 25 59
Paraffin price (øre/kWh-utilized) 48 4.58 123
Fuel-oil price (øre/kWh-utilized) 39 0.35 76
Firewood price (øre/kWh-utilized) 51 0.96 154
 
Household annual gross income (NOK) 373 271 95 8 950 900
Number of household members 3.20 1 12
Net floor space (m2) 128 12 550
Heating degree days during winter season 3 012 2 239 4 291
 
Opportunity to use paraffin (0, 1) 0.24 0 1
Opportunity to use fuel oil (0, 1) 0.04 0 1
Opportunity to use firewood (0, 1) 0.80 0 1
 
Number of electric heaters 5.05
 
0 30
Number of rooms with electric floor heating 1.48 0 12
Number of firewood stoves 1.07 0 11
Number of paraffin stoves 0.13 0 3
a) The reason some households (2.5%) have a zero electricity consumption is that they are registered with zero expenditure in the SCE. The 
two main reasons are that the electricity bill is included in the rent (in the case of tenants) or is paid by the employer. 
b) Acquired quantities (not consumption) calculated in utilized kWh. 
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3.2. Econometric specification 
To illustrate the problem of aggregating demand over heterogeneous households, we estimate a linear 
demand function in which price and income derivatives and the standard deviation of the error term 
depend on household characteristics. We assume that the consumption of electricity in household h 
(qh) comprises a deterministic component ( hµ ) and a stochastic component ( hε ), and in which the 
deterministic component is approximated by a linear function.10 Electricity consumption in household 
h is given by: 
 
(19) ,hhhhj
J
j
h
j
h
j
hhhh yOEpq εβγαεµ +++=+= ∑  
 
where hy  is annual real income in household h and pjh is the price of energy good j for household h. 
To ensure that only the prices of the goods that the household can consume enter the individual 
demand function, we multiply the price variables by a dummy variable, OEjh, which equals unity if the 
household can consume good j, and equals zero otherwise. We assume that the stochastic component 
is independently and normally distributed with a zero mean, ( ) 0=hE ε , and has a variance that depends 
on the characteristics of the household, 2hσ . 
 
In order to test for heterogeneity in the demand response, we assume that the constant term ( hα ), the 
price derivative ( hjγ ), the income derivative ( hβ ) and the stochastic component ( hσ ) are functions of 
observed household characteristics ( hθ ), given in equation (20). These characteristics include the 
stock and capacity of heating equipment and other characteristics of the household and residence, such 
as the number of household members, the type of residence (detached house, block of flats, 
farmhouse) and the stock of household appliances. A complete list of the variables that have 
significant effects is given in Table 2. 
                                                     
10 The linear demand function facilitates testing of the hypotheses of reverse aggregation and the existence of an aggregate 
demand function, but is sufficiently complex to illustrate the problems of aggregation. 
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We allow all parameters to differ across households, including the variance of the error term. We also 
allow the income derivative to vary with income. This is done to test the assumption that income 
enters linearly into the demand function (see hypothesis (ii) below). This heterogeneity in the 
estimated parameters ( hα , hjγ , hβ  and hσ ) ensures that there is a unique demand function for each 
individual household. In the next section, we specify testable hypotheses for reverse aggregation, the 
existence of an aggregate demand function and Gorman’s representative consumer. 
3.3. Tests for reverse and linear aggregation 
To be able to assume the existence of an aggregate demand function, Gorman’s representative 
consumer and reverse aggregation under the assumption that prices vary across agents (as is the case 
for Norwegian household electricity consumption), the individual demand function must have three 
properties. First, income must enter linearly into the demand functions; that is, the income derivatives 
must be independent of income: 
 
(i) 
0:
0:
1
0
≠
=
y
y
H
H
β
β
. 
 
This follows from Gorman’s polar form, in which income enters linearly into the micro function. 
Second, we need to test if the partial derivatives with respect to income are equal across agents. If they 
are not, a redistribution of income between two households changes aggregate demand without 
changing aggregate income, and hence an aggregate demand function does not exist as a function of 
aggregate income. Thus, we need to test the hypothesis: 
(ii) 
0:
0:
1
0
≠
=
r
r
H
H
β
β
 for all r. 
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If these two criteria are met, we can assume the existence of an aggregate demand function when 
prices are the same for all households. In addition, to assume the existence of Gorman’s representative 
consumer, all constant terms must be zero: nn ∀== ,00 αα . 
 
When prices vary across households, the partial derivatives with respect to prices must be the same for 
all households if an aggregate demand function, reverse aggregation and/or Gorman’s representative 
agent are to exist. That is: 
 
(iii) 
0:
0:
1
0
≠
=
j
f
j
f
H
H
γ
γ
 for all combinations of j and f. 
 
We need to test whether these criteria are met for demand functions estimated using micro data when 
we allow heterogeneity across households with respect to price and income derivatives and when we 
allow the income derivative to be a function of income. If the criteria (i) to (iii) hold, we can assume 
reverse aggregation and can use microeconometric estimates for the mean household to predict the 
aggregate demand response. We can also estimate an aggregate demand function as a function of 
aggregate prices and income to determine the aggregate demand response. If the null hypotheses are 
rejected, we may experience disaggregation bias when predicting the aggregate demand response by 
using the properties of the mean household’s electricity demand. If hypotheses (i) and (ii) are rejected, 
the existence of an aggregate demand function (and of Gorman’s representative consumer) cannot be 
guaranteed even if the prices are equal across agents. To be able to assume Gorman’s representative 
agent, additional restrictions on the constant term must also be imposed; to be specific, the constants in 
hα  cannot be significantly different from zero. 
 
If none of these criteria are met, it may still be reasonable to assume the existence of Muellbauer’s 
representative consumer. Since we focus on when it is appropriate to use the estimated properties of 
the micro function to calculate the properties of the macro function (reverse aggregation), testing for 
non-linear aggregation is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
3.4. Estimation results and tests 
To test the hypotheses (i) to (iii), we estimate the demand functions in (19) and (20) by using the 
maximum likelihood estimation procedures in NLOGIT 3.0 and Limdep 8.0 (Greene 2002) on the data 
from the Norwegian SCE. The estimation results are presented in Table 2. In the first column, we list 
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the parameter being estimated; in the second column, we list the variables that have a significant effect 
on the parameters or those whose effect on the parameter we want to test for significance (such as 
income); in the third column, we report the estimated coefficients; in the fourth column, we report the 
t-statistics; and in the last column, we report the estimated p-values.  
Table 2. Results from ML estimation of the model for Norwegian household electricity de-
mand. 100 000 kWh 
Parameter Variable Coefficient t-value p-value
Constant term ( hα ) Constant 0.2719 17.58 0.0000
 Number of household members 0.0142 8.61 0.0000
 Block of flats (1, 0) –0.0249 –5.41 0.0000
 Cottage ownership (1, 0) 0.0202 7.30 0.0000
 Moved during the last 12 months (1, 0) –0.0257 –5.04 0.0000
 Tenant (1, 0) –0.0203 –5.75 0.0000
 Collective central heater ownership (1, 0) –0.0397 –3.36 0.0008
 Electricity as the main energy source (1, 0) 0.0218 7.16 0.0000
 Number of washing machines 0.0139 2.33 0.0199
 Number of dishwashers 0.0117 4.10 0.0000
 Number of tumble dryers 0.0079 2.96 0.0031
 
Electricity price ( h1γ ) Constant –0.0045 –13.10 0.0000
(øre per kWh)  Number of electric heaters 0.0001 6.25 0.0000
 Number of rooms with electric floor heating 0.0001 6.39 0.0000
 Net floor space (m2) 0.0000 3.61 0.0003
 
Paraffin price ( h2γ ) Constant –0.0008 –2.28 0.0227
(øre per kWh)  Number of heating degree days (1000 degree days) 0.0002 1.89 0.0588
 Capacity of electric heating equipment (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) 0.0001 2.61 0.0091
 
Fuel-oil price ( h3γ ) Constant –0.0010 –5.03 0.0000
(øre per kWh)  Capacity of electric heating equipment (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) 0.0003 3.75 0.0002
 
Firewood price ( h4γ ) Constant 0.0001 1.37 0.1702
(øre per kWh)  Number of firewood stoves 0.0001 2.69 0.0071
 Capacity of wood stoves (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) –0.0001 –2.34 0.0195
 
Household income ( hβ ) Constant 0.0001 0.15 0.8810
(10,000 NOK)  Net floor space (m2) 0.0000 2.66 0.0078
 Number of children –0.0002 –3.39 0.0007
 Detached house (1, 0) 0.0007 6.38 0.0000
 Household income (10,000 NOK) 0.0000 –1.38 0.1673
Standard deviation ( hσ )  Constant –3.0981 –135.94 0.0000
 Net floor space (m2) 0.0028 15.82 0.0000
 Capacity, oil-based heating equipment (0, 1, 2, 3, 4) –0.0563 –5.28 0.0000
 Household income (10,000 NOK) 0.0053 9.20 0.0000
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The table indicates that the constant terms are significant. Thus, we cannot assume the existence of 
Gorman’s representative consumer. The price derivatives indicate significant heterogeneity across 
households for all energy prices. In particular, variation in the stock and capacity of heating equipment 
generates heterogeneity in the price derivatives across households. There is also significant 
heterogeneity in the income derivative. Hence, one cannot guarantee that there is a unique aggregate 
demand function for Norwegian household electricity consumption as a function of aggregate income. 
One may also experience problems with reverse aggregation. However, the income derivative does not 
depend significantly on income at a 10 per cent level. Thus, the assumption that income enters linearly 
into the demand function (as is assumed in Gorman’s polar form) is not rejected. 
 
Given these results, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of policy instruments on aggregate electricity 
consumption in Norwegian households. This is because it may be appropriate neither to estimate an 
aggregate demand function nor to use the properties of the estimated demand function for the mean 
household based on micro data to predict the aggregate demand response. To calculate the aggregate 
effect, we must sum up the predicted demand responses from each individual household whilst 
allowing for heterogeneity in the individual demand responses. To do this, we need to build a micro 
simulation model of Norwegian household electricity consumption. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we focused on the similarities and differences between reverse aggregation and the 
existence of an aggregate demand function and a representative consumer. First, the perspective 
differs. The theory of the representative consumer is concerned with the existence of an aggregate 
demand function and whether it may be given behavioural and welfare implications. The problem of 
reverse aggregation relates to the potential disaggregation bias that arises when microeconometric 
estimates are used to predict aggregate demand responses and aggregation problems are not accounted 
for. We are concerned with reverse aggregation because, although it has been shown theoretically that 
elasticities from micro and macro relationships differ if consumers are heterogeneous,11 elasticities 
based on micro estimates are often used in macro models. Furthermore, when micro estimates for the 
mean household are multiplied by the population size to obtain an estimate of the aggregate demand 
response, there is no discussion of potential disaggregation bias. 
 
                                                     
11 See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Stoker (1986), Buse (1992) and Denton and Mountain (2001, 2004). 
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Strong restrictions must be imposed on the properties of the micro function to be able to use micro 
estimates for the mean consumer to predict the aggregate demand response in a theoretically consistent 
way.12 These restrictions are stronger than those needed to ensure the existence of an aggregate 
demand function and Gorman’s and Muellbauer’s representative consumers when prices are equal 
across agents. When prices vary across agents, the criteria for reverse aggregation are the same as 
those for an aggregate demand function. The criteria for an aggregate expenditure share function allow 
for more heterogeneity in the micro functions. Thus, using micro estimates to predict aggregate 
demand and aggregate demand responses may cause disaggregation bias unless the micro functions 
are linear in income and prices. Heterogeneity across agents is only allowed in the constant term. If 
there is heterogeneity in the price and income derivatives, the assumption behind reverse aggregation 
may not be appropriate. With respect to linear aggregation, heterogeneity in price derivatives is 
allowed when prices are equal. In the case of non-linear aggregation, heterogeneity is allowed in both 
the income and price derivatives through the functions describing the distribution of prices and income 
( hikm  and 
h
ig ), even if prices vary across consumers. 
 
Why use micro rather than macro data to estimate aggregate demand if stronger assumptions must be 
made when using micro data? The answer relates to the existence of the representative consumer, 
which is necessary if price and income derivatives estimated from macro data are to be interpreted as 
behavioural response to policy instruments. If agents are too heterogeneous, assuming the existence of 
a representative consumer is not appropriate. It may not even be meaningful to estimate an aggregate 
demand function if agents differ in their income responses, since a redistribution of wealth changes 
aggregate demand. In this case, the macro function does not necessarily exist, and the only relevant 
option is to use micro data. Thus, we must test whether reverse aggregation is possible and whether 
the assumption of a representative consumer is appropriate. If neither test is met, which is the case for 
Norwegian household electricity consumption, micro data must be used to estimate price and income 
responses. Heterogeneity across consumers must be allowed for. Then, individual responses are 
summed to obtain the aggregated response. 
 
In general, all forms of non-linearity in the demand function create problems with reverse aggregation. 
The reason is that non-linearity creates heterogeneity in price and income derivatives across agents. 
We may also experience problems with reverse aggregation when many consumers record zero 
consumption, as in the case of several energy goods, for example firewood. The effect that 
                                                     
12 Whether these restrictions are satisfied in practice is an empirical question. 
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observations of zero have on aggregating micro properties to the macro level is beyond the scope of 
this paper. In future work, we aim to build a micro simulation model based on estimating Norwegian 
household electricity consumption by using data from the Norwegian Survey of Consumer 
Expenditures to illustrate and quantify the disaggregation bias. 
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Appendix 
Aggregation and generalized linearity 
In this appendix, we explain why a consistent aggregation of budget shares is possible in the case of 
generalized linearity (GL) when prices are equal across households, and discuss whether non-linear 
aggregation is possible when prices differ across consumers. 
A.1 Equal prices across consumers 
Consider the case in which prices are equal across consumers and the distribution of income is 
exogenous in the consumption decision. Under what conditions on the micro expenditure share 
functions ( hiw ) does an aggregate expenditure share function ( iW ) exist as a function of aggregate 
income (Y)? That is: 
 
(A1) ( )( ) ∑===
h
h
i
h
H
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i wY
yyygpW
Y
pQW .....,,, 1 . 
 
Non-linear aggregation implies that the expenditure shares are linear functions of each other when 
aggregate wealth changes at given prices, even if the Engel curves are not linear. This property is 
known as GL. Muellbauer has shown that necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
( )( )Hii yygPW .....,,, 1  function to exist are that the micro relations are given by: 
 
(A2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )pygpcypbpaypfq hhiihihihihi ,, ++== , 
 
where either (i) ( ) 0=∑
h
h
i pa , or (ii) ( ) 0=pci . The second case is equal to linear aggregation, 
whereas the first is the case of non-linear aggregation. Heterogeneity in micro behaviour is allowed in 
the form of different constant terms, ( hia ), and different functions, 
h
ig . However, the coefficients ib  
and ic  must be identical across agents. In order for a macro function based on the micro function in 
(A2) to be integrable, which implies the existence of a representative agent, we also need to assume 
that ( )∑ =
i
i
h
i ppa 0 , ( )∑ =
i
ii ppb 1 and ( )∑ =
i
ii ppc 0 . The corresponding macro demand function 
is: 
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...,,, 1 . In case (i) ( ) ( )pcpc ii =* , whereas in case (ii) 
( ) ( )∑=
h
h
ii papc
*  and ( ) 1.....,,, 1 =∑
h
Hh
i yypg . A special case of the GL function in (A3) is the price-
independent generalized linear (PIGL) function, where hig  is a function of income only. 
 
The micro and macro expenditure shares are given by equations (A4) and (A5), respectively, in the 
case of non-linear aggregation (that is, in case (i)): 
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To see that the GL structure ensures the existence of an aggregate expenditure share function as a 
function of aggregate income, we insert the micro expenditure shares in equation (A4) into (A1), 
which yields the aggregate expenditure share function in equation (A5). 
 
Muellbauer has shown that, given the GL structure on the micro functions, the properties of the micro 
function transfer to the macro relationship, in which case, equation (A3) can be interpreted as the 
demand of a representative consumer. The aggregated functions in (A3) and (A5) can be written either 
as a function of all individual incomes or as a function of the income of a representative consumer 
( oY ): ( )oii YpWW ,≡ . The income of a representative consumer is implicitly defined by the equation 
( ) ( )∑=
h
hh
i
o
i ypgYYpg ,, . That is, the income of the representative consumer is the aggregate 
income that makes the properties of the micro function transfer to the macro relationship. 
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The representative income may differ from observed aggregate income; that is, YY o ≠ .13 Thus, the 
existence of Muellbauer’s representative agent allows the quantities demanded by the representative 
agent to differ from aggregate demand. This is because, when the problem is defined in terms of 
expenditure shares, aggregate consumption is given by iii pYWQ = , whereas the consumption of the 
representative agent is i
oo
i
o
i pYWQ = , which is different when YY
o ≠ . 
A.2 Is non-linear aggregation possible when prices vary across agents? 
Does an aggregate expenditure share function exist when prices vary across consumers and can we 
interpret the aggregate expenditure share as the share of a representative consumer? That is, under 
what conditions on the micro expenditure share functions ( hiw ) does an aggregate expenditure share 
function ( iW ) exist as a function of aggregate income (Y) and the mean price ( ip )? That is: 
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We focus on the case of non-linear aggregation. We try to generalize case (i) in equation (A2) to apply 
when prices, in addition to income, vary across consumers. We assume the function hig  is independent 
of prices (cf. the discussion of the consequences for aggregation of an endogenous leisure decision in 
Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a), and depends only on income. Additionally, we define a function, hkm , 
which describes the heterogeneity in the price derivative with respect to the price of good k. In 
addition, we assume that all coefficients in the demand function are equal across consumers:14 
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Can the micro function in (A7) ensure the existence of an aggregate expenditure share function as a 
function of the mean price and aggregate income when prices, as well as income, vary across 
consumers? The micro expenditure share function associated with the demand function in (A7) is 
given by: 
                                                     
13 See, for example, Forni and Brighi (1991) for a discussion. 
14 In order for the micro function in (A7) to be integrable, and in particular for it to satisfy the adding-up condition, we also 
need to assume that ∑ =
i
ii pb 1 and ∑ =
i
ii pc 0 . 
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Checking the right-hand side of equation (A6) by inserting equation (A8) into the criterion for the 
existence of an aggregate expenditure share function, we obtain: 
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determine whether equation (A6) holds, which enables us to write the aggregate expenditure share as a 
function of aggregate income and mean prices, we check whether the right-hand side of the equation 
equals the left-hand side. To do this, we need to find the aggregate demand function when prices are 
allowed to vary across consumers. Hence, we have: 
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Inserting (A10) into the right-hand side of the aggregate expenditure share function in (A6) yields: 
                                                     
15 The term ∑=
h
h
kkikki PaPa  is the effect on aggregate consumption of good i of the price on good k. 
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Since (A9) equals (A11), the micro expenditure function in (A8) ensures the existence of an aggregate 
expenditure share function as a function of mean prices and aggregate income. The aggregate 
expenditure share can either be written as a function of individual prices and income, or as a function 
of a representative price, ( oip ), and a representative income, (
oY ).The representative price and 
income is found implicitly by finding the values of oip  and 
oY  that satisfy the functions 
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Equation (A9) shows that price and income derivatives differ across consumers because the functions 
( )hhi yg  and ( )hkhik pm  vary across consumers. That is, assuming the existence of an aggregate 
expenditure share function (and Muellbauer’s representative agent) when prices are allowed to vary 
across consumers does not ensure reverse aggregation. 
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